Conversing with Lawrence C. Heilman’s *USAID in Bolivia: Partner or Patrón?*

Chris Krueger

*Independent Scholar*

**Abstract**

This piece works off the contents of Larry Heilman’s book also based largely on his personal experience of decades in USAID and subsequent research over at least ten years. The first part follows the chronology of his work, that covers some 70 years of U.S. development assistance to Bolivia citing key points for each period. A second part provides information about the view of development/wellbeing in today’s Bolivia. Finally, some elements are presented to consider a possible new era of cooperation beyond the current impasse.

**Keywords**

Bureaucratization, cold war politics, development history, imperialism, U.S.-Bolivia relations
This article began as a review of Heilman’s book noting his two main questions. The first one from the subtitle, “partner or patron”? I knew the answer without reading the book and afterwards, I realized that we are on the same side if from different vantage points.1

In his introduction, Heilman raises the second question “how could (President Evo) Morales terminate the USAID relationship in such an abrupt manner?” Treating that question seriously called for more than a typical review, especially given that the Morales government has produced volumes of information in recent years documenting U.S. interference in Bolivia as they see it, much of it through USAID.

A book review would not normally include the amount of chapter by chapter detail found here. But I wanted to follow enough of the history to give

---

1 I worked in USAID as an intern and consultant during the 1980’s and at the Inter-American Foundation (1988-2003), including a period as representative for Bolivia (1996-2003). The two agencies (USAID and IAF) represent different tracks of U.S. government, foreign policy and international development. I had grown critical of USAID as a fundamentally bureaucratic/technocratic organization from an agency that described itself throughout Latin America as NOT USAID, NOT part of the State Department and NOT governed by U.S. (short-term) foreign policy. For a sense of the Inter-American Foundation approach in Bolivia, see Kevin Healy’s Llamas, Weavings and Organic Chocolate, Multicultural Grassroots Development in the Andes and Amazon of Bolivia (2001).
readers a sense of the elephant and a basis for understanding this Bolivian case and the transcendent issues in play.

The Story

Heilman’s stated purpose is to tell the story of U.S development cooperation with Bolivia, a history of more than 70 years (1941-2013) and an investment of some $4.6 billion. He began this gargantuan task in 2003, but it took on new meaning after USAID’s expulsion from Bolivia in May 2013.

After a brief introduction, Heilman offers a chapter on the Bolivian context that provides only general descriptive and statistical information. I was at first chagrined by what passed for “context,” but also recognized that it is typical of the documents that one reads and even may help write inside government agencies, as if these numbers told an adequate story without cultural, historical or intellectual references and certainly no discussion of geopolitics. Yet these documents, both reflecting and reifying partial and often faulty assumptions, are used to defend USAID’s programs to the U.S. Congress, justify multi-million dollar budgets and explain its ideas and activities to the world.

At the end of the chapter, Heilman sets his key question: patrón or partner? by borrowing from Victor Andrade, a Bolivian diplomat during the 1940-60’s, to introduce the figure of the patrón before whom the Indian peon kneels. For Heilman and Andrade (himself the patrón in the story), the Indian peoples represent the principal context and challenge faced by Bolivia and by U.S. development cooperation with Bolivia:

The Indians’ lack of access to modern society was nearly complete: limited access to market, very little access to education and health services, and no access to basic rights. They had neither voice nor vote in government. Their lives were as bleak and as harsh as the Altiplano itself. Only dramatic changes in social attitudes and political practices could break the cycle of poverty and ignorance to which the Indian family was bound. (13)

One understands that Heilman wanted to be and wanted USAID to be a partner in meeting those challenges, not a patrón that generated and benefitted from indigenous poverty with little regard for their humanity and personhood. At the same time, that view is radically devoid of a sense of that humanity and personhood and more consistent with a view of development as
“the white man’s burden.”

Subsequent chapters cover each U.S. presidential period beginning with Franklin Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor Policy and culminating with the greatly diminished programs under George W. Bush and Barak Obama. In each chapter, Heilman outlines the context in Washington, the context in Bolivia and the corresponding organization and programs of USAID and its institutional predecessors. Each chapter provides grist for many articles and books that could result from analysis of USAID documents including scores of staff and consultant reports and from studies by bolivianists from different disciplines.

The Presidents and Their Policies

Franklin D. Roosevelt (1933-1945) launched the “Good Neighbor Policy” in 1933 as a strategy to confront spreading fascism in Latin America. Even prior to the U.S. entry into WWII, support for the war effort had meant securing strategic resources from Bolivia, including tin, tungsten, rubber and chichona bark (to make quinine for medical purposes).

The “development” aspects of the U.S.-Bolivia relationship date to 1942 when the U.S. State Department sent Merwyn Bohan, a foreign service officer stationed in Colombia, to lead a team of public and private sector consultants to study Bolivia’s prospects for economic development. The context at that time was Bolivia’s overdependence on mining and extreme poverty and backwardness on all fronts, characteristics that might well lead to sympathy for foreign doctrines such as fascism or communism. The Bohan Report recommended economic diversification away from mining and into the “oriente” (eastern lowlands and jungle). According to Heilman, for the next thirty years this was the framework for U.S. assistance in road-building, agroindustry, gas and oil production and health and sanitation. It was certainly

2 William Easterly’s book by this title (reminiscent of Rudyard Kipling’s poem) helps put the Bolivia case and Heilman’s book in a larger perspective captured in the subtitle: Why the West’s Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done so Much Ill and so Little Good.

3 An insightful book on this period is Max Paul Friedman’s Nazis and Good Neighbors: The United States Campaign against the Germans of Latin America in World War II (2003). This exceptionally well-documented history reveals much about the inner workings of complex foreign policies. It also brings a fundamental historical framework to the fore: U.S. development policy was born out of the death and destruction of World Wars I and II and not merely a desire for markets or imperialist instincts.
key in the growth of Santa Cruz and the shape of Bolivia today.  

Heilman remarks over and again that the recipes for what was generally regarded as development came out of U.S. rural experience and later the rebuilding of Europe after World War II. The development establishment as we know it decades later did not yet exist. Bolivia was one the first cases of planned intervention, something that was shaped more by bankers, businessmen and politicians than development professionals. Missionaries should also be included in the mix.

After WWII, Harry Truman (1945-52) laid out his vision of world-wide development assistance following on the success of the Marshall Plan in rebuilding Europe. If Roosevelt was challenged with defeating fascism, Truman’s bogey man was communism; qualifying for “development assistance” was overtly conditioned on a country’s rejection of it.

In 1951, the U.S. and Bolivia signed a Technical Cooperation Agreement as part of Truman’s Point Four program. In Bolivia, institutions were established to oversee programs in agriculture, health and education in addition to road construction and hydrocarbon development. After the National Revolutionary Movement (MNR) took power in April 1952, U.S. development assistance to Bolivia and its involvement in Bolivian national politics escalated sharply. A U.S. Overseas Mission (USOM) was opened in La Paz and by the end of 1952, it had 39 U.S. personnel supervising more than 400 Bolivians.

Heilman maintains that Victor Paz Estenssoro requested U.S. assistance for major reforms to bolster the revolution. He frequently returns to the 1952 Revolution as the touchstone for USAID policies and programs for the rest of the century. Other authors see U.S. development support as subversive because it was largely targeted to weakening more radical segments of the MNR.

---

4 I am not aware of any serious work on Bohan or the report. A good analysis of these beginnings would be key to understanding the mix of interests and motives in play at the time and how they evolved to where we are today.


6 In later years, the number of “foreign hires”/Bolivians employed by USAID was much smaller (see Heilman, Appendix I). This number probably refers to field workers in different projects rather than directly employed by USAID.

7 James Seikmeier and Juan Carlos Zambrana see U.S. assistance as aimed at debilitating the more radical wing of the MNR under Juan Lechín, leader of the miners’ movement.
Substantive implementation of the 1951 Agreement occurred under Dwight D. Eisenhower (1953-1961) who felt that Truman had been soft on communism and that private investment should take precedence over U.S. government support. Early on, Eisenhower sent his brother Milton to Bolivia to report on the situation. Heilman reports that brother Milton was alarmed by the poverty and believed that the U.S. had “everything to gain by being generous to this poor country.” Of Paz Estenssoro and the MNR, Milton Eisenhower wrote:

The President and his associates may have been inexperienced, sometimes critical of us, and more inclined to socialism than Americans generally prefer, but they are not communists. (63)

The Point Four program laid out its operational procedures and trained staff in Bolivia as it did in other Point Four countries. Heilman describes this early period as one when

U.S. technicians providing technical and administrative leadership in the Servicios (sector programs) worked directly with the Bolivian officials who were their counterparts. The U.S. employees took a hands-on approach. They were in the field with their Bolivian colleagues managing agricultural research stations, leading curriculum development training sessions, sponsoring health education campaigns throughout Bolivia, and directing the construction of a road network. (60)

Heilman makes another observation that some would consider well-meaning, others an expression of hubris and still others proof of imperialism:

The rationale buttressing these activities was grounded in the conventional economic development wisdom of the day. The Yankee recipe for transforming Bolivia into a modern nation had been proven on the farms and in the public schools from one end of the Unites States to the other. U.S. technicians arrived in Bolivia with project designs for the most part already fixed in their heads. (62)

He adds: “too often U.S. advisors did not recognize that their role was to be a catalyst in a process concerned with developing Bolivian institutional capacity” (70). An attitude more like patrón than partner.

and later Paz Estenssoro’s vice president. Zambrana argues that given distance and historical relations, U.S military invasion was not an option for Bolivia like it was in Guatemala (1954) and that development assistance was the way to weaken the more radical aspects of the revolution and buy Bolivia’s support.
When John F. Kennedy (1961-63) took office in 1961, the “communist threat” in Latin America was on the U.S. doorstep (Cuba) and led to the creation of the Alliance for Progress with the double pillars of development and counterinsurgency, later continued under Lyndon B. Johnson (1963-69). It was under Kennedy that the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) was formally established through reorganization of diverse programs into what became a Washington-based entity with bureaus organized along geographic and technical lines to oversee country missions and interface with other Washington actors, especially the State Department and Congress.

Most of this longest chapter in the book (chapter 5) deals with the organization and operation of the USAID bureaucracy. In contrast to the field-based, hands-on approach of earlier years, Heilman writes that

Ingrained routines in USAID Missions dictated the day’s actions to be pursued by Mission officials. The priority of the day was to be found in the piles of cables from Washington that demanded responses. (102)

[...] To get way from interminable meetings and the mountainous in-box, U.S. technicians in Bolivia could escape (to project sites). Mission Program Officers on the other hand, were stuck in La Paz responding to the unremitting stream of inquiries from Foggy Bottom-based kibitzers. (103)

Heilman views the Alliance for Progress in Bolivia as having re-energized the promises of the 1952 revolution. He notes especially the acceleration of land reform and numerous small projects that put the campesinos at the center of development processes in their communities. He refers to the period as one where “U.S. AID professionals were imbued with a sense of the inevitability of progress” but adds that “few comprehended the complexity of Bolivia’s development problems.” (118)

Failure to comprehend complexity is one explanation. Another is offered by Jeffrey Taffet who documents the derailing of the Alliance for Progress by political and business interests echoing Friedman’s analysis of how Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor Policy was undermined by self-serving interests, some U.S.-based and others Latin American.

At the outset of his presidency, Richard Nixon (1969-1977) sent Nelson Rockefeller, a prime figure in U.S. policy and programs in Latin America since the days of FDR, on a mission to various Latin American countries to assess the situation and make recommendations. Rockefeller and his contingent were met by demonstrations criticizing the U.S. all along the way, which Heilman
notes. Rockefeller’s recommendation to dismantle what he considered a highly bureaucratized USAID and replace it with an economic and development corporation within the executive branch, came to naught.  

The development dimension of the Alliance for Progress was largely eclipsed during the 1960s by its military ventures. U.S.-friendly René Barrientos Ortúño had studied in the U.S. to become a pilot and several years later became the head of the Bolivian Air Force. Barrientos served as Paz Estenssoro’s vice president, but led a coup against him in 1964. After some jockeying, Barrientos was elected. In 1968, Bolivian and U.S. military collaborated in the assassination of Che Guevara. In 1969 Barrientos died in a helicopter crash and was succeeded briefly by Alfredo Ovando Candía (1970) and Juan José Torres (1971), both more inclined towards the Soviet Union. Hugo Banzer Suárez (1971-1978), another friend of the U.S., became president by coup. Heilman gives no hint about U.S. involvement in those changes nor the existence of the insidious Plan Condor that pushed anti-communism to new extremes throughout South America in the 1970’s and was responsible for assassinating Torres in Argentina in 1976.

He does outline how USAID’s project planning process became more “sophisticated,” including sector (health, education, agriculture, infrastructure, et al) assessments and project designs carried out largely by USAID professionals and contractors, mostly from the U.S. who visited Bolivia for periods of days or a few weeks.

Points mentioned by Heilman for the James Carter period (1977-1981) include comments and actions by Carter’s appointment to head USAID, John Gilligan, who described the agency as “over aged, over paid, and over here”

---

8 Under FDR, Rockefeller headed the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs that was later absorbed into the State Department (executive branch). Perhaps this was the model he had in mind. However, as Heilman’s book shows, the relationship between USAID and the State Department has been problematic and made it virtually impossible for USAID to claim political independence. At stake is the fundamental difference between development as a long-term apolitical process and the State Department as a tool for political, often short-term interests.

9 See John Dinges’ The Condor Years (2004) and the movie “Olvidados” by Carla Ortiz (2015)

10 One of the strongest criticisms of USAID spending is that a great share, if not most, stays in U.S. pockets and operations rather than being invested in local economies. This is largely a political matter based in (mostly Republican) Congressional opposition to spending U.S. taxpayer dollars overseas and its insistence that foreign aid benefit the U.S. directly.
(156). After a trip to Haiti, he reportedly fired the Haiti Mission Director after being invited to lunch with him next to his swimming pool while attended by white-gloved servants. Thereafter, Gilligan

...let it be widely known that every USAID officer stationed overseas should think twice about how an inappropriate lifestyle could undermine the U.S. government’s goal of aiding the poor throughout the development world (157).11

Reductions in USAID staff and budgets under Carter continued a trend started by Nixon and Ford. Between 1969 and 1977, the number of positions (worldwide) shrank from 17,600 to 5700. While specific numbers for the Latin American and Caribbean Region are not given, Heilman notes that other world regions (principally Asia and Africa) were larger. The Carter administration decided to concentrate resources in the Caribbean, but Bolivia, still the poorest country in the hemisphere behind Haiti, continued to receive comparatively high levels of development assistance. Programs directed to the rural poor with an emphasis on basic human needs were expanded into Tarija, Chuquisaca, Beni, Pando and Potosí, virtually the entire country. While such presence may seem massive, it should not be taken as coverage. In each department there would have been targeted areas and populations with projects usually meant as demonstrations or pilots to be replicated at larger scale with Bolivian resources. In reality as Heilman acknowledges, when USAID funding ended so too did the projects.

In 1975, USAID began to promote “alternative development” to combat coca production in the Chapare where during the 1960’s, the Agency had begun promoting settlement programs by constructing roads and basic infrastructure while never dreaming, as Heilman observes, that “these would serve so splendidly the interests of coca bush farmers and narco-traffickers for the next fifty years.” (163)

Heilman points to a dilemma associated with USAID since its founding: on the one hand, it was seen as short-lived and mandated to work itself out of a job. Nevertheless, by the mid-1970’s

11 I have known a broad range of USAID personnel over the years. Many are highly dedicated and knowledgeable of development challenges and doing everything they can to meet them. Others seem more interested in the overseas adventure and the perks associated with their jobs, especially better housing than they might afford in the U.S., maids, child care workers and gardeners.
It was clear that USAID, as a public institution funded by the U.S. government was here to stay. Instead of indicators of steady progress being made in the developing world, the citizens of many countries were slipping into deeper poverty. The doubling of populations through Latin America was overwhelming the progress in agriculture, education and health. (158)

Several pages in this chapter (chapter 7) discuss both the need and the difficulty of assessing the effectiveness of development in order to answer heightened congressional and public doubts about the wisdom of spending U.S. taxpayer dollars overseas. While modest accomplishments could be identified in specific areas, it was essentially impossible to attribute them to USAID programs:

The issue of rising expectations compounded the problem of measuring success. Politicians in Bolivia and Washington promised support and progress, and the expectations created in the minds and hearts of the campesinos grew beyond what could ever be realistically accomplished. USAID development professionals living and working in Bolivia began to understand that even with the best development efforts of the Bolivian government and the generous support of the donor community, meeting the basic human needs of Bolivia’s rural poor was a receding horizon. (168)

After some respite under Ford and Carter in the battle against communism as the overarching purpose of foreign aid, Ronald Reagan (1980-88) ratcheted up competition with Russia and replaced concerns for basic human needs in Latin America with concerns for U.S.-defined democracy and loyalty to the U.S. (not a new theme as we have seen). It was his administration that gave the world the political organizations that have been denounced by Bolivian (and other) analysts as being instruments of U.S. interference in national affairs: National Endowment for Democracy and National Democratic Institute and International Republican Institute. Certainly all of these have noble discourses and have benefitted some individuals through their programs. Through them and other U.S.-based organizations

Improving judicial systems, strengthening legislatures, creating electoral institutions, promoting a free press and fortifying democratic practices in municipal government operations became mainline activities for many USAID Missions around the world. (172)

Such programs were the heart of “nation-building,” practically a mantra of the time and generally unquestioned by USAID employees and indeed believed to be necessary for the good of Bolivia and Bolivians. Nation-building
essentially refers to the strengthening political, economic and social institutions to act on behalf of citizens in the various areas of competence that make up the state and extends to the training of personnel and citizens. In poor, underdeveloped countries, these institutions are typically controlled by elites and favor their interests while the majority or significant portions of the population are excluded. When pursued with imperialistic or geopolitical motives, nation-building becomes competition for allies and even when pursued for the good of the nation-in-building, it has been done according to the view of the builder, in this case the U.S. with its preconceived notions as Heilman noted earlier.

Determined to defeat the “evil empire,” Reagan appointed Henry Kissinger to examine the extent of Russian influence in Latin America. Kissinger reported extensive scholarship programs to train Latin Americans in virtually all fields of endeavor:

The immediate reaction to the Soviet challenge was reinvigorated military, intelligence and development programs funded by the U.S. government throughout Latin America. In nearly every Latin American country where USAID had a presence, funding for participant training programs was increased [...] always supplemented with educational experiences that demonstrated democratic practices and good governance. Several thousand Latin Americans, including Bolivians, benefitted from the surge of both short and long-term training programs provided by the U.S. government. (172)

Heilman traces how USAID adapted its programs to Reagan priorities, noting that it was really a matter of putting new labels on things they were already doing. One difference, which he refers to as a sea change was “outsourcing,” that is the increased use of universities, nongovernmental organizations and development businesses to carry out USAID programs—all of this as the other side of the coin of what was promoted at home as downsizing the U.S. government.  

In Bolivia, USAID personnel (including officers, foreign hires and contractors) numbered 56 in 1953 (Point Four Program), 276 in 1963 (Alliance for Progress) and 156 in 1979 (information included in Heilman’s Appendix I, 299). The number of contractors, mostly hired from the U.S., doubled from 26 to 52 between 1970 and 1979 and presumably increased further after that.

12 In effect, downsizing led to the multiplication of relationships between U.S. and Bolivian actors many of whom expanded these beyond the USAID purview.
Unfortunately, Heilman’s figures are more than three decades short of the situation at the time of USAID’s expulsion in 2013.

The economic chaos of the early 80’s in Bolivia culminated with the election of Victor Paz Estenssoro for the third time in 1985 and the introduction of the “Washington Consensus” led by the IMF and the World Bank in league with the U.S. government. The consequent structural adjustment (Heilman does not use this term, but rather the more euphemistic New Economic Policy that he attributes to the Paz government) included drastic measures to downsize COMIBOL, the state-owned mining company. Somewhat ironically, this resulted in hundreds of miners using their separation pay to set themselves up in coca production in the Chapare region of Cochabamba just when the other hand of U.S. policy was intensifying police and military efforts to eradicate coca production in a program that has been described as low intensity warfare. From this period forward, USAID programs were intertwined directly or indirectly with the U.S. war on drugs that, also ironically, set the stage for the rise of Evo Morales from coca leader to anti-U.S. president.\(^\text{13}\)

Under George HW Bush (1989-1993), the U.S. continued a stick approach to Bolivia. In 1991, the U.S. forgave $372 million of Bolivian debt recognized as unpayable. In 1990, Bush announced an escalated anti-drug program that poured more than $1 billion into “alternative development” programs in Bolivia, Columbia, Peru and Ecuador. As Heilman notes, “in Latin America, Bush’s hot war on drugs had replaced the Cold War” (196). He devotes several pages to describing the inner workings of this program in Bolivia, information that complements more extensive writings by such organizations as the Washington Office on Latin America and the Institute for Policy Studies.

Under Bush 41, U.S. intervention in Bolivia increased in the guise of the drug war and USAID programs that focused on “Democracy and Governance” as they did throughout the Andes and Central America. The latter continued USAID involvement in judicial, legislative and electoral reforms begun under Reagan. According to Heilman, these programs always enjoyed Bolivia’s “agreement.”\(^\text{14}\) Programs to address basic needs continued, but they were

---

\(^\text{13}\) There are several biographies of Evo Morales that document U.S. actions against him from attempted assassination to arrest and expulsion from parliament, facts that remain beyond anti-imperialist bias.

\(^\text{14}\) Such agreement is meant to imply “willing” and therefore not imperialistic. Friedman cites several official documents that note how even decades ago, the U.S. recognized that it must take care that its policies be perceived as beneficial and desirable even when they are not.
overshadowed by attempts to reform Bolivia’s government institutions and wipe out coca production.

William Clinton (1993-2001) followed 12 years of Republican presidents and was faced with a huge national debt. Heilman portrays him as trying to both re-energize and streamline U.S. government operations at home and abroad. Like other aspects of government, USAID’s budget and personnel were cut and internal processes made more efficient by executive standards.

When Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada took office in August 1993, after having served as Paz Estenssoro’s Minister of Planning during the New Economic Policy/Structural Adjustment period, he began to implement far-reaching reforms in democracy and governance and went on to privatize some ten state-owned companies purportedly to raise capital to support reforms and bolster the economy.\(^{15}\) Especially important under Sánchez de Lozada were the Municipal Decentralization and Popular Participation laws that put budgets in the hands of municipal authorities and required them to work with their local populations in setting priorities.\(^ {16}\)

Although Heilman titles the chapter on the Clinton period as “USAID’s development surge,” there is little to support the notion of surge. He again devotes more time to the reforms that took place in USAID than to the substance of its programs, noting that

Regardless of the rhetoric, the substance and the rhetoric of the U.S. government’s development program under the direction of the Clinton administration remained essentially the same as that pursued by Bush 41’s administration. (214)

Heilman closes this chapter with a vignette that speaks volumes. He is referring to USAID’s new building in Obrajes occupied in 2002.

The new and spacious Mission was tucked away on a side street where few

\(^{15}\) One of the limitations of this article is the lack of information at hand about the results of these reforms. My understanding is that the amounts of capital obtained were much less than expected and needed and that the real beneficiaries of the program were the buyers who obtained full management control with only 50 percent ownership.

\(^{16}\) These watershed practices are still in effect and widely credited with the growth of local participation throughout Bolivia. However, leaders in a rural community in Oruro explained to me once that these innovations upended indigenous traditions and politicized their lives because they brought money and political parties into equations where they didn’t exist before.
Bolivians would venture unless they had specific business to transact with the Mission. In an attractive pink building protected with a high wall, the Mission was a short drive from La Florida and Calacoto,\(^\text{17}\) where most US citizens lived. Once in the building one never need leave the premises during the workday, for it had an excellent cafeteria in an attractive setting where USAID employees could get a good meal at a reasonable price. (234)

Apparently, USAID had come 180 degrees from the days when its employees rolled up their sleeves and worked alongside Bolivians in field operations. While the latter may seem preferable, it depends on what their relationship was. As Heilman asks, partner or \textit{patrón}?

George W. Bush (2001-2009) opened his presidency with promises to support commerce and foreign assistance in Latin America. These were quickly undermined by the September 11, 2001, attack on the World Trade Center and the reallocation of foreign assistance monies to Iraq and Afghanistan. In 2001, USAID funds for Bolivia increased to $154.8 million (in constant 2014 dollars), doubling what it had been in Clinton’s last year only to slide down steadily to 62.8 million by 2008 (see Heilman, Appendix 3).

Heilman cites George Hyman, author of a 2010 publication by the Center for Strategic and International Studies at Georgetown University, to say that

The bipartisan story of the deterioration of USAID over four different administrations (two Republican and two Democrat) (has been a) regrettable path, one with deleterious consequences for development and one that illustrates how good intentions can have systemic dysfunctions. (242)

USAID has gone from an independent development agency to ever greater policy and organizational integration with the State Department. With that integration, the distinction between development policy and foreign policy, like the Cheshire cat is harder and harder to discern. Not a great deal of difference remains other than their two distinct smiles. (243)

While Bush 43 increased U.S. funding for development around the world, his government placed increased funds in a new entity, the Millennium Challenge Account.\(^\text{18}\) USAID continued its programs in Alternative

---

\(^{17}\) The wealthiest neighborhoods in La Paz; southern zone.

\(^{18}\) Bolivia’s proposal to the MCA from the Morales government was initially ranked among the best received (personal communication from GOB representative to the MCA). Nevertheless, Bolivia was removed from the list of eligible countries presumably because of the Morales government’s criticisms of the U.S. Around the same time, the U.S. began to decertify Bolivia’s efforts to control coca production, although
Development, sustainable forestry, democracy and governance and more limited health programs. After Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada’s demise late in 2003, democracy-building efforts pushed into political hotspots such as El Alto.

Near the end of the Bush 43 period, Bolivia expelled U.S. ambassador Philip Goldberg (September 2008) accused of conspiring to destabilize the Morales government. The U.S. followed suit expelling ambassador Gustavo Guzman. The two countries still do not have ambassadors after more than a decade.

The chapter on the Barak Obama period (first term, 2009-2013) “Ending USAID’s Development Drama” opens with a suggestion that USAID might be (once again) reformed, regain its independence from the State Department and become the lead agency in a policy focus that placed development on a par with diplomacy and defense.

Many would agree that Obama never really engaged with Latin America, certainly nothing like his rhetoric implied. Was it because the geopolitical world centered in the Middle East and increasingly in Asia? because withdrawal from ongoing programs seemed an appropriate tactic for moving to a new era? because his rhetorical overtures found few counterparts as Latin American countries, especially in South America, were exploring new options beyond the U.S.?  

Goldberg’s role deserves close study. From the outset, the Morales government saw him as a force for separatism following his role in Kosovo and accused him repeatedly of promoting opposition in the eastern part of Bolivia known as the Media Luna. According to news reports I saw in La Paz, Goldberg justified his encounters as just doing his job by meeting with all sides of the conflict although Minister David Choquehuanca asked him to desist. Was he not, after all, a guest in the country? How was his job defined? His attitude earned him the nickname “the last viceroy” in Bolivia. Goldberg was subsequently named Director of National Intelligence in Washington. During his confirmation hearing he was praised for his role in Bolivia and characterized by Senator Feinstein as following U.S. policy. Goldberg testified that an armed Bolivian mob had threatened the U.S. Embassy, something that news reports showed to be untrue (see “Nomination of Philip S. Goldberg” in Congressional Record vol. 156, N° 20, S540).

At the 2009 Summit of the Americas, Obama proposed a new era in hemispheric cooperation based on an equal partnership and indicated his intention to revisit U.S.-Cuba relations. He seemed at best naïve, however, when he told his audience to “forget the past” (something Heilman does not mention).

In December 2011, the Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribeños was formed with 33 countries and excluding the U.S. and Canada. Hugo Chávez and Sebastian Piñera were the first co-chairs. Earlier that year, the Unión de Naciones
An already drastically reduced USAID budget in Bolivia fell further under Obama. In 2009, it was $25.12 million (in 2014 constant dollars; probably inherited from the planned Bush 43 budget), increased in 2010 ($37 million) and 2011 ($43 million) and then fell to about $10 million in 2012 and less than $2 million for 2013 when the Mission was closed (See Appendix 3).

Afterthoughts

Heilman seems somewhat sympathetic to a Morales’ view of the U.S. as a colonial force. He recognizes U.S. interference in the 2002 election by then ambassador Manuel Rocha who infamously warned Bolivians they would lose U.S. foreign assistance if Morales were elected. In fact, while “Goni” won by a slight margin and assumed power through a pact that included Reyes Villa, Morales gained substantial ground and emerged as a serious contender for the future. That future was only a few years later. And as we have seen, assistance was indeed cut dramatically.

Mirroring his own sympathies and probably those of other USAID colleagues, but contradicting other U.S. spokespersons like Rocha, Heilman closes this chapter saying that

Among the many ironies that might be cited in the departure of USAID from Bolivia is the realization that the U.S. foreign assistance program was ended by the kind of leader that the U.S. government wanted to emerge—one that was elected in the most democratic elections ever held in Bolivia, who emerged from the majority indigenous community, and who typically pursued the hope and needs of the poorest of the poor... (283)

In his concluding chapter, “Past is Present,” Heilman replays the major themes treated in earlier chapters affirming partnership and common goals as dominant in a relationship that also had its strains and attempts at manipulation from both sides. He regrets that it is virtually impossible to measure the outcomes of USAID’s multiple programs. He recognizes that the Suramericanas (UNASUR) also became active. Neither organization shows the protagonism declared in its founding documents and UNASUR lost about half of its members in early 2018.

22 Another interference in the election was the role of the U.S. consulting firm Greenberg and Associates (including James Carville) as campaign advisers who mounted a dirty war against Manfred Reyes Villa. This case was documented by Rachel Boynton in “Our Brand is Crisis” (2006) and portrayed in a movie with Sandra Bullock in 2016.
entrance of military aid in the cause of fighting coca production and drug trafficking greatly complicated the picture, before and certainly after Evo Morales’ election to the Presidency in December 2005.23

Heilman has indeed managed to tell significant parts of the USAID in Bolivia story as he indicated was his purpose. As to how Evo Morales could have terminated the relationship in such an “abrupt manner,” many of Heilman’s own observations suggest that there was much to be desired with regard to USAID and its effectiveness in terms of Bolivia’s real needs. And in its final years in Bolivia, the USAID budget fell to a fraction of what it had been at its height or even as an average over decades (see Heilman’s appendices). These data suggest that the U.S. had essentially withdrawn prior to being expelled.

Meanwhile, Heilman reports that the Bolivian government’s investment in “development” under Morales has grown from $2 billion to $10 billion per year. Might it be argued that USAID worked itself out of a job like its founders had envisioned? In fact, USAID no longer has missions in most Latin American countries. Other donors have also withdrawn or been expelled from Bolivia leaving very little of the international development establishment that grew up after WWII. This situation reflects a certain “progress” with most countries in the region having become mid-level income countries as compared to Africa.

Clearly, an era has come to an end for U.S. involvement in Bolivian development, an involvement that has been arguably more pervasive and invasive that in any other country in Latin America.

Will there be a new and improved round of official institutional relations? In Washington circles, one hears the term “normalization.” Insofar as that might imply getting back to a previous state, that seems neither likely nor desirable. Nor is it clear what the terms of a new relationship might be. The window that opened when Barak Obama was elected the first African American president has closed and nothing has happened to re-open it.24

During 2011, there were several high-level meetings between Bolivian and U.S. government representatives and in November, a “framework

23 See the discussion of such controversies in Kathryn Ledebur’s “Bolivia: Clear Consequences” (2005).

24 After Obama was elected in November, but before he took office in January, Evo Morales came to Washington to an OAS meeting in the hope of being one of the first presidents to meet Obama. Obama was not yet in DC so the meeting never happened (personal experience at OAS session).
agreement for bilateral relations of mutual respect and collaboration between the plurinational state of Bolivia and the United States of America” was signed. Then, it was widely thought in official sources that continued negotiations would lead to political dialogue and to programs in commerce, development and drug trafficking as well as to the reinstatement of ambassadors. To date there has been no movement to implement that agreement nor have ambassadors been reinstated after a decade.

A Bolivian View

Meanwhile, the Morales government has defined its Agenda Patriótica 2025 and its National Development Plan 2016-2020. Under these, it proposes to “reach the bicentennial with a country that is transformed and ready to move ahead during the XXI century as one of the continent’s greatest in happiness and harmony, complementarity and solidarity, social and spiritual wealth without exclusions and inequalities (Introducción, Plan Nacional 2016-2020, 8. My translation).25 In government discourse, the term “development” is disparaged as “desarrollismo” and replaced with the overarching goal of wellbeing [Vivir Bien]:

Wellbeing is a civilizationsl horizon and a cultural alternative to capitalism and modernity born from the worldviews of original peasant indigenous peoples and nations, intercultural communities and afro-Bolivians and is fundamentally intercultural. It is reached in collective, complementary and solidarity manners realized practically in social, cultural, political, economic, environmental and affective dimensions, permitting the harmonious blending of all the beings, components and resources of Mother Earth. It means living in complementarity, harmony and equilibrium with Mother Earth and societies, in equity and solidarity and eliminating inequalities and mechanisms of domination. It is wellbeing among ourselves, with those around us and with oneself. (Artículo 5, Numeral 2 de la Ley N° 300, Marco de la Madre Tierra y Desarrollo Integral para Vivir Bien. Plan de Desarrollo Económico y Social, 9-10)

[El Vivir Bien es el horizonte civilizatorio y cultural alternativo al capitalismo y a la modernidad que nace en las cosmovisiones de las naciones y pueblos indígena originario campesinos, y las comunidades interculturales y afro-bolivianas, y es concebido en el contexto de la interculturalidad. Se

---

25 All translations of texts originally written in Spanish are mine.
alcanza de forma colectiva, complementaria y solidaria integrando en su realización práctica, entre otras dimensiones, las sociales, las culturales, las políticas, las económicas, las ecológicas, y las afectivas, para permitir el encuentro armonioso entre el conjunto de seres, componentes y recursos de la Madre Tierra. Significa vivir en complementariedad, en armonía y equilibrio con la Madre Tierra y las sociedades, en equidad y solidaridad y eliminando las desigualdades y los mecanismos de dominación. Es Vivir Bien entre nosotros, Vivir Bien con lo que nos rodea y Vivir Bien consigo mismo].

Bolivian media today are full of promotional spots about the unprecedented amounts of money that the government is spending in humanitarian and infrastructure programs. Hardly a day, certainly not a week goes by without government works being debuted with the presence of Evo Morales or Alvaro García Linera. The program “Bolivia Cambia Evo Cumple,” originally funded with Venezuelan funds, built dozens of sports fields and stadiums, schools, water systems and community centers before ending in mid-2018.

In keeping with practices established over two decades ago, municipal and departmental offices as well as the central government have their plans and programs. Budgets for these operations have increased substantially with funds from hydrocarbon revenues (Impuesto Directo a los Hidrocarburos, IDH) that soared during most of the Morales period, but have fallen since 2015.

Bolivian government and international statistics claim that tens of thousands of families have emerged from extreme poverty during the Morales governments. However, it remains to be seen whether the change is structural or an artifact of cash transfers and whether these result in meeting basic needs such as health, education and housing. Answering these questions and documenting results calls for continuous monitoring and analysis, something that in turn calls for indicators, data gathering methods and a framework of accountability to people by government. While the Constitution calls for social control by citizens in all levels and sectors, examples of social control are difficult to find beyond local communities and municipal governments. Ministries and departmental governments gather data as part of their annual budget exercises but as with bureaucracies everywhere, the stories they tell are often skewed. The National Development Plan has goals and results expected by 2020 for each of its 13 pillars, but no public strategy for data gathering.
Another issue for monitoring and analysis is whether resources intended for development/improved well-being are being used appropriately and effectively. Accusations of project funds siphoned off by official corruption are rampant but virtually impossible to investigate and report in Bolivia as elsewhere. The Oderbrecht case (Brazil) in current news reaches into several other countries, including Bolivia. In Bolivia, there is little investigative reporting, so charges of kickbacks, padded prices and use of inferior materials in spite of laws requiring competition and transparency in government contracting go largely unchecked. Eliminating corruption is a global challenge, especially when it is poor people who are being defrauded.

Since 2014, there has been a steady stream of audiovisual and written material produced by the Bolivian government (ministries of the presidency and vice presidency) criticizing U.S. interference in Bolivia over decades, virtually a century. I would wager that no other country has produced such extensive documentation about U.S. involvement nor has U.S. involvement been so pervasive for so long. Former Minister of the Presidency and current ambassador to Cuba, Juan Ramon Quintana Taborga has been a singular force in making volumes of data available to the world. These are grist for study and debate by scholars of many disciplines, development professionals, politicians and activists. They include:

- A six-part series entitled "InvasiónUSA: Historia de la intervención de Estados Unidos en Bolivia (1920-2014)". Available on Youtube. Nearly six hours that outline the U.S. role in Bolivia with emphasis on negative aspects. Although it does not consider larger geopolitics or the complexity of people and organizations, this documentary is an important reference for defining Bolivia-U.S. history and the thinking and experience that guide the Evo Morales government.


26 Quintana has publicly linked his opposition to U.S. imperialism to his stint at the School of the Americas for counterinsurgency training as an army captain. The SOA has been an object of protest and demands for its closing in the U.S. For an extended discussion of the School of the Americas see Lesley Gill’s The School of the Americas. Military Training and Political Violence in the Americas (2004).
an outline for future research and an appendix on the chronology of relations between the U.S. and Bolivia.

- A volume coordinated by Juan Ramón Quintana Taborga in 2016 titled *BoliviaLeaks: La injerencia política de Estados Unidos contra el proceso de cambio (2006-2010).* This book compiles materials released by Wikileaks referring to the first years of the Morales presidency and includes analysis by four researchers.

- A six-volume series coordinated by Quintana Taborga in 2017, titled *Un Siglo de Intervención de EEUU en Bolivia.* Volume I 1900-1925, 311 pp., Volume II 1926-1938, 261 pp., Volume III 1939-1949, 335 pp., Volume IV 1950-1964, 365 pp., Volume V 1965-1981, 401 pp. and Volume VI 1982-2000, 491 pp. These volumes are chronological and represent the culmination of all the publications listed above. In addition to the specific facts, each volume contains a general presentation, an analytical synthesis of the period and a description of methodology used across the volumes. The general presentation included in the six-volume series concludes:

  Our desire is that students who come in the future will read each page of these books carefully in order to rewrite our history and help dismantle indifference in the face of the abuse of power by those who believe themselves the owners of the world. Our greatest desire is that one feels indignation but also that profound changes be made in the long century that we lived under the yoke of imperialism. (Presentación General, 8)

  [Deseamos que los estudiantes que vengan en el futuro lean con detenimiento cada página de estos libros para reescribir nuestra historia y ayuden a desmantelar la indiferencia frente al abuso de poder de quienes se creen dueños del mundo. Nuestro mayor deseo es que se sienta indignación, pero también se produzcan cambios profundos frente al largo siglo que nos tocó vivir bajo el imperio de la sumisión].

To the above list should be added Juan Carlos Zambrana’s work *Destrucción de Naciones: el arma global de Estados Unidos Desarrollada en Bolivia* (2015), partially published in this and the previous volume of the BSJ. Zambrana also sees his mission as documenting a nefarious history, while hoping for a more positive future.
A new era? Cooperation or geopolitics?

Heilman’s book helps us see an era; the one in which the U.S. became an empire against its own founding principles and better instincts; an era that is waning, hopefully to make way for a better one. Perhaps Heilman’s contribution may prompt some corners of USAID and the State Department to analyze programs against their own rhetorical objectives and norms. The Larry Heilmans of that world are poised to make insightful contributions. They would not need to finally solve questions of attribution and causality. Rather, they are legitimate key informants with access to technology and processes for consultation and for getting to meaningful knowledge with the help of history and hindsight. Perhaps they will be joined by bolivianists with specialized knowledge of people and processes.

If there is to be a new era, the U.S. may need to acknowledge a nefarious past rather than simply ask to turn a new page as Obama advocated at the first Summit of American Presidents after his election. It is probably even more necessary that new ways of “cooperating” become operative, ones that express programmatically the terms of the mutual respect and collaboration outlined in the 2011 agreement (see Appendix to this article).27 It seems equally indispensable that Latin American ideologues and conspiracy theorists come to see that institutions and actors are more complex and dynamic than such frameworks allow. Refusing to turn the page may lead to more harm than good for more people.

In a world that is increasingly dominated by east-west rather than north-south relations and U.S. hegemony is giving way to multi-polarity, there is need for a shared hemispheric vision that illuminates bilateral relations. That said, the Morales government has forged geopolitical relations with China, Russia and Iran making official relations with the U.S. more difficult if not unlikely. In the case of China, evidence suggests that Bolivia is not holding to the same standards of environmental protection and workers’ rights nor transparency in contracts that it proclaims in its own laws and would exact from the U.S. or in the name of anti-imperialism.28 For its part, in late 2018 the White House

---

27 The Framework agreement was signed for the U.S. by María Otero who was born in Bolivia and came to the U.S. as a child. At the time, she was Assistant Secretary of State for Global Affairs.

28 See “La Ruta de la Presencia China en Bolivia.”
and the State Department have taken positions against the participation of Morales in the 2019 elections, a polarizing issue in Bolivia and one that the Bolivian people are entitled to decide on their own.\textsuperscript{29}

In a world context in which crisis abounds and well-being for all is the goal, effective cooperation is desirable. Luckily, opportunities also abound, beyond official programs and government relations. Bolivia and the U.S. share populations, languages and cultures, business, trade and academic relations that remain active and will continue to play roles in the foreseeable future and may help a new era to emerge.

Works Cited


EASTERLY, William. 2006. \textit{The White Man’s Burden: Why the West’s Efforts to Aid the Rest have done so Much Ill and so Little Good.} New York: Penguin Press.


\textsuperscript{29} Such declarations in the past have been accompanied by punitive actions or support for opposition actors. Hopefully, this will not be the case. However, they do encourage Bolivian opposition figures based in the U.S. such as Miami-based Carlos Sánchez Berzain (self-exiled Minister of Defense under Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada) to support opponents of Morales in Bolivia (see www.carlossanchezberzain.com).


OLVIDADOS. 2015. Screenplay and production, Carla Ortiz.


QUINTANA Taborga, Juan Ramón, coord. 2016. BoliviaLeaks: La injerencia política de Estados Unidos contra el proceso de cambio (2006-2010). La Paz: PIEB.


APPENDIX

Convenio Marco de Relaciones Bilaterales de Mutuo Respeto y Colaboración entre el Gobierno del Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia y el Gobierno de los Estados Unidos de América

Suscrito en la ciudad de Washington, el 7 de noviembre, 2011
CONVENIO MARCO DE RELACIONES BILATERALES DE MUTUO RESPECTO Y COLABORACIÓN ENTRE EL GOBIERNO DEL ESTADO PLURINACIONAL DE BOLIVIA Y EL GOBIERNO DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS DE AMÉRICA

PREFÁMBULO

El Gobierno del Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia y el Gobierno de los Estados Unidos de América, de aquí en adelante denominados las “Partes;”

Guiados por un deseo de renovar y hacer progresar sus relaciones bilaterales en el siglo XXI;

Considerando que el respeto mutuo y la cooperación entre gobiernos y pueblos es esencial en la promoción de la paz mundial y del desarrollo sustentable;

Reconociendo que ambos países tienen diferentes niveles de desarrollo económico y social;

Persuadidos de que el diálogo político entre gobiernos contribuye a establecer espacios para acuerdos respetando las diversas visiones;

Reconociendo que la expansión del comercio puede hacer una contribución importante a la promoción del crecimiento y desarrollo y que dicha expansión del comercio debería beneficiar a todos los participantes de la economía de un país;

Tomando en consideración el ordenamiento jurídico respectivo de cada Parte, incluyendo la Constitución Política del Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia y la Constitución de los Estados Unidos de América; y

Enfatizando la necesidad de fortalecer e intensificar los esfuerzos bilaterales de las Partes para enfrentar los desafíos mundiales en la lucha contra la producción y tráfico de narcóticos de una manera más integral, de acuerdo con el principio de la responsabilidad común y compartida;

Acuerdan lo siguiente:
ARTÍCULO 1
PRINCIPIOS Y PROPIÓTOS

Los principios y propósitos que rigen este Convenio Marco son aquellos consagrados en la Carta de las Naciones Unidas, la Carta de la Organización de los Estados Americanos, la Declaración Universal de los Derechos Humanos y los acuerdos multilaterales de los cuales Bolivia y Estados Unidos de América son partes. Esos principios, entendidos en su contexto, incluyen:

1. Respeto a la igualdad soberana y a la integridad territorial de los Estados;

2. El deber de abstenerse de intervenir en asuntos internos de otro Estado;

3. El derecho de cada Estado a elegir, sin injerencias externas, su sistema político, económico y social;

4. La obligación de promover y consolidar una democracia representativa, con el debido respeto al principio de no intervención, reconociendo que la solidaridad de los Estados americanos y los altos ideales que se desean alcanzar a través de dicha solidaridad requieren la organización política de aquellos Estados sobre la base del ejercicio eficaz de la democracia representativa;

5. Respeto universal y observancia de los derechos humanos y libertades fundamentales;

6. Promoción de solución de controversias por medios pacíficos, absteniéndose de recurrir a la amenaza o el uso de la fuerza en contra la integridad territorial o la independencia política de otros Estados;

7. El desarrollo de relaciones amistosas y de cooperación basadas en el respeto al principio de igualdad de derechos y autodeterminación de los pueblos;

Las principios contenidos en este artículo están tomados de las fuentes identificadas aquí: Primer Numeral: Carta de la ONU, Art. 2; Par. 1. 4. Numeral dos: Carta de la OEA, Art. 2(b), numeral seis: Carta de la OEA, Art. 1. Numeral cuatro: Carta de la OEA, Art. 2(b), numeral cinco: la Declaración Universal de los Derechos Humanos; Numeral seis: Carta de la OEA, Art. 2(b) y 3(c); Carta de la ONU, Art. 2, Par. 3. 4. Numeral siete: la Carta de la ONU, Art. 1; Par 1 y 2. Numeral ocho: la Carta de la OLA, Art. 3(b).
8. Reconocimiento de que la justicia social es una base para la paz duradera, y

9. La necesidad de implementar políticas y estrategias para proteger el medio ambiente, promover el desarrollo sostenible en beneficio de las presentes y futuras generaciones.

ARTÍCULO II
ALCANCE Y OBJETIVOS

El alcance de este Convenio está referido a un conjunto de intereses mutuos en la relación bilateral, incluyendo el diálogo político, la responsabilidad compartida en la lucha contra el narcotráfico y acciones de cooperación, así como de comercio e inversión. Los intereses mutuos de comercio e inversiones se reconocen como un tema importante y serán tratados por el Consejo de Comercio e Inversiones (CCI) de las Partes. Este Convenio no excluye la cooperación en otras áreas de interés mutuo que no se encuentren incluidas en el presente documento. Los objetivos del presente Convenio incluyen:

1. Fortalecer y profundizar las relaciones bilaterales respetando los principios del Artículo I,

2. Promover y mejorar el desarrollo humano, económico, social, y cultural de manera ambientalmente sostenible así como la paz, la salud y el bienestar de los ciudadanos de cada Parte;

3. Aprobar acciones de cooperación eficaces contra la producción y tráfico de sustancias narcóticas ilícitas en el marco de la responsabilidad compartida de las Partes para tales acciones;

4. Ampliar la cooperación en la aplicación de la ley, incluyendo la extradición, asistencia legal mutua, la aplicación de las normas contra la falsificación y la piratería de la propiedad intelectual, así como la cooperación en la recuperación del patrimonio cultural, y en la lucha contra el lavado de dinero y la corrupción; y
5. Fortalecer las relaciones comerciales entre las Partes a través del Consejo de Comercio e Inversiones.

ARTÍCULO III
LINIERAMIENTOS DE LA COOPERACIÓN

1. La cooperación será definida por los Estados dentro del marco de las estrategias y prioridades nacionales de desarrollo y de las estrategias y prioridades de la cooperación internacional de las Partes;

2. La cooperación será diseñada respetando las respectivas leyes y políticas de cada Parte;

3. Ambas Partes reconocen que las organizaciones públicas, privadas, público-privadas y organizaciones no gubernamentales tienen roles apropiados en la implementación de la cooperación. El tipo de la organización u organizaciones ejecutoras, así como los criterios y el proceso de selección de las mismas, junto con otros temas relacionados con los proyectos, programas, recursos y evaluaciones, se definirán siguiendo las consultas realizadas conforme a los procedimientos establecidos en el Artículo VII en conformidad con la legislación y las políticas de cada Parte;

4. Las organizaciones ejecutoras de los programas y proyectos de cooperación en el territorio de una Parte están obligadas a cumplir con la legislación interna de aquella Parte;

5. Para alcanzar el máximo rendimiento posible de la cooperación, ambas Partes considerarán medios para eliminar la duplicidad innecesaria de proyectos;

6. Ambas Partes buscarán asegurar que la cooperación sea de naturaleza no-partidista; y

7. Ambas Partes establecerán coordinación con el objeto de asegurar la transparencia con respecto a la cooperación, de manera consistente con las leyes estadounidenses y bolivianas.
ARTÍCULO IV
RESPONSABILIDAD COMPARTIDA
EN LA LUCHA CONTRA EL NARCOTRÁFICO

Sobre la base del principio de la responsabilidad común y compartida, las Partes acuerdan trabajar conjuntamente en la lucha contra la producción y tráfico de narcóticos ilegales para prevenir, combatir y reducir eficaz y mesurablemente, la producción, tráfico y consumo de drogas ilegales. Las Partes reconocen la importancia de enfrentar estos problemas de manera amplia, incluyendo la cooperación con las organizaciones narcotraficantes y el crimen organizado, la acción eficaz para reducir la disponibilidad del material requerido para la producción de drogas ilegales, el desmantelamiento de las rutas y métodos del narcotráfico y la destrucción de drogas ilegales y del material utilizado para la fabricación de drogas ilegales, el desmantelamiento de actividades de lavado de dinero y la promoción de desarrollo económico alternativo integral. Las Partes reconocen que la demanda de drogas en las naciones consumidoras y la oferta de drogas desde las naciones productoras tienen efectos corrosivos en las sociedades de todas las naciones.

Las Partes perseguirán el objetivo de ampliar y consolidar un relación de cooperación antinarcóticos, enfocándose no solo en la provisión de asistencia, sino también en la construcción de una relación de cooperación fundamentada en la creencia de que aspectos específicos de la producción de drogas ilegales y de la actividad criminal y la actividad criminal transnacional asociadas producen un impacto perjudicial sobre ambas Partes y por lo tanto se deben enfrentar con firmeza, seriedad y de manera coordinada.

En esta tarea, y cuando sirva al interés de este Convenio Marco, las Partes complementarán y coordinarán mutuamente sus esfuerzos con los gobiernos vecinos de la región y con entidades interesadas como la Organización de las Naciones Unidas (ONU), la Organización de Estados Americanos (OEA), el Grupo de Acción Financiera de Sudamérica (GAFISUD), la Unión Europea y la Unión de Naciones Suramericanas (UNASUR). Las Partes reconocen la importancia de
trabajar con contrapartes regionales e internacionales en la lucha contra la producción ilícita de narcóticos y en la identificación y desmantelamiento de organizaciones de tráfico de drogas.

Las Partes renuevan su compromiso de asegurar que todos los aspectos de la reducción de la demanda, reducción de la oferta y cooperación internacional sean enfrentados en total conformidad con las obligaciones internacionales, incluyendo aquellas relacionadas con la lucha contra el narcotráfico y los derechos humanos, con pleno respeto a la soberanía e integridad territorial de los Estados, el principio de no-intervención en asuntos internos de los Estados, la protección y promoción de los derechos humanos y las libertades fundamentales, el respeto por la dignidad inherente de todos los individuos y los principios de igualdad de derechos y respeto mutuo entre los Estados. La contribución de recursos para luchar contra el narcotráfico será llevada a cabo dentro de este marco de responsabilidad común y compartida así como en el marco de los lineamientos establecidos en el Artículo III.

ARTÍCULO V
PROMOCIÓN DEL CRECIMIENTO POR MEDIO DEL COMERCIO E INVERSIÓN

Las Partes reconocen los beneficios para cada Parte provenientes de un comercio e inversión ampliados. Las Partes continuarán utilizando el Consejo de Comercio e Inversiones, conforme con los principios establecidos en el acuerdo que crea este Consejo, para:

1. Explorar caminos para ampliar y diversificar el comercio en las áreas priorizadas por las Partes con el fin de promover el crecimiento y fomentar las condiciones donde los más pobres puedan cosechar los beneficios del desarrollo y del comercio internacional,
2. Identificar medidas apropiadas para alentar el comercio en bienes y servicios para mejorar las condiciones para el desarrollo a largo plazo y la diversificación del comercio entre las Partes y de manera más amplia; y

3. Aumentar la interacción entre los varios sectores económicos de las Partes para promover la inversión como un medio para impulsar el crecimiento, la generación de empleos y el desarrollo económico.

ARTÍCULO VI
MEDIOS DE COOPERACIÓN

Los mecanismos de cooperación entre las Partes deberán incluir, según sea apropiado:

1. Acuerdos específicos en áreas pactadas por las Partes para establecer programas, proyectos y proveer asistencia técnica y económica, educación e intercambios culturales, desarrollo de infraestructura u otros medios de cooperación que acuerden las Partes;

2. Intercambios de información, conocimiento técnico e investigación, de acuerdo con las leyes aplicables de las Partes con respecto a dichos intercambios; y

3. Actividades y programas decididos mancomunadamente por la Comisión Conjunta establecida en el Art. VII.

Las Partes están de acuerdo en tomar las acciones necesarias para permitir la cooperación acordada, de manera concordante con sus leyes, políticas y procedimientos internos respectivos.
ARTÍCULO VII
COMISIÓN CONJUNTA

Las Partes acuerdan establecer una Comisión Conjunta para la implementación del presente Convenio Marco de Relaciones Bilaterales de Mutuo Respeto y Colaboración. Cada Parte nombrará representantes de alto nivel para constituirse en integrantes de la Comisión, uno de los cuales deberá actuar como Presidente de esa Parte. Los dos Co-Presidentes deberán consultar entre ellos y planificarán la agenda de las reuniones de la Comisión Conjunta.

1. La Comisión Conjunta se reunirá de manera alterna en cada país una vez cada dos años y cuando así lo convengan las Partes para cubrir todos los aspectos pertinentes del Convenio Marco y desarrollar un diálogo político con la finalidad de:

a) Analizar el estado de las relaciones bilaterales de las Partes y, de ser necesario, proponer medidas para su fortalecimiento;

b) Intercambiar puntos de vista sobre la situación hemisférica e internacional;

c) Monitorear, hacer seguimiento y evaluar las relaciones bilaterales principalmente en las áreas de cooperación y lucha contra el narcotráfico. Los asuntos de comercio e inversión serán tratados por el Consejo de Comercio e Inversión y

d) Abordar cualquier controversia que pueda surgir en las relaciones bilaterales y cualquier otro tema bilateral que las Partes consideren pertinente en el marco del presente Convenio Marco.

2. Representantes de alto nivel en el área de la cooperación, de manera concordante con los lineamientos del Artículo VII, se reunirán de manera alterna en cada país por lo menos una vez por año y, por acuerdo de las Partes, para:
a) Identificar las áreas y sectores específicos de la cooperación acordada;  
b) Identificar programas, proyectos y recursos;  
c) Identificar las áreas geográficas de acción;  
d) Establecer grupos de trabajo especializados para la implementación eficaz y óptima de programas y proyectos de manera concordante con los lineamientos del Artículo III;  
e) Evaluar la implementación eficaz y eficiente de programas y proyectos;  
f) Determinar las modificaciones necesarias y relevantes a programas y proyectos existentes con la intención de mejorar su eficiencia; y  
g) Coordinar los asuntos que sean considerados necesarios por acuerdo de las Partes.

5. Representantes de alto nivel en el área de la lucha contra el narcotráfico se reunirán de manera alterna en cada país por lo menos una vez por año y por acuerdo de las Partes, para un diálogo específico, de manera concordante con los conceptos del Artículo IV, con el fin de:  
a) Identificar y definir áreas de acción, programas, proyectos, y recursos;  
b) Evaluar la implementación eficaz y eficiente de programas y proyectos;  
c) Determinar las modificaciones necesarias y relevantes a programas y proyectos existentes con la intención de mejorar su efectividad;  
d) Establecer grupos de trabajo especializados para la óptima y eficaz implementación de proyectos y programas, cuando sean necesario; y  
e) Considerar todos los demás asuntos necesarios.

4. Representantes en el área del comercio e inversión se reunirán a través del Consejo de Comercio e Inversiones de manera alterna en cada país una vez
por año o por acuerdo de las Partes para llevar a cabo las acciones definidas en el Artículo V y los objetivos del CCI, los cuales son:

a) Identificar y eliminar impedimentos para los flujos de comercio e inversiones;

b) Realizar consultas en asuntos específicos de comercio e inversión de interés para las Partes; y

c) Monitorear las relaciones comerciales y de inversión, para identificar oportunidades para la ampliación del comercio y la inversión y negociar acuerdos cuando sea apropiado.

ARTÍCULO VIII
CONSULTAS Y DIFERENCIAS

Las Partes deberán implementar el presente Convenio Marco de buena fe y deberán solucionar cualquier diferencia que sufra de la interpretación o implementación del presente Convenio a través de consultas y negociaciones por la vía diplomática.

ARTÍCULO IX
ENTRADA EN VIGENCIA, TERMINACIÓN Y MODIFICACIÓN

El presente Convenio Marco entrará en vigencia desde la fecha en la que se efectúe un intercambio de notas confirmando que cada Parte ha cumplido los requisitos internos necesarios para poner el presente Convenio Marco en vigencia.

1. El presente Convenio Marco podrá ser terminado por cualquiera de las Partes después de transcurridos seis meses a partir de una notificación escrita. En caso de terminación, los programas y proyectos de cooperación existentes continuarán hasta su conclusión a menos que cualquiera de las Partes informe a la otra Parte a través de los canales diplomáticos que un programa o proyecto específico deberá ser concluido. Los términos del presente Convenio Marco y
de cualquier otro acuerdo vigente deberán aplicarse a cualquier programa o proyecto que continúe después de la terminación del presente Convenio Marco.

2. Las Partes podrán, por consentimiento mutuo y por escrito, modificar el presente Convenio Marco.

ARTÍCULO X
DISPOSICIÓN FINAL

Los acuerdos entre las partes permanecen en vigor y la entrada en vigor de este Convenio Marco no afectará los derechos y obligaciones bajo dichos acuerdos.

En el caso de que cualquiera de las partes considere que cualquier disposición de dichos acuerdos sea incongruente con los artículos precedentes, dicho asunto será tratado a solicitud de cualquiera de las partes en aplicación de los procedimientos previstos en el artículo VII de este Convenio Marco.

FIRMADO en Washington en dos ejemplares, el día 7 de Noviembre de 2011, en los idiomas español e inglés, siendo ambos textos igualmente válidos.

POR EL GOBIERNO
DEL ESTADO PLURINACIONAL
DE BOLIVIA:

[Signature]

[Signature]

POR EL GOBIERNO
DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS
DE AMÉRICA:

[Signature]